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EXPLAINING THE RISE OF “HUMAN RIGHTS” IN ANALYSES OF SINO-AFRICAN 
RELATIONS1
 
Shaun Breslin and Ian Taylor 
 
This article seeks to unpack why it is that human rights has emerged as an issue in 
critical analyses of Sino-African relations. Whilst not seeking to minimise some of the 
real concerns and issues, we aim to contextualise the motives of much of the critique, 
particularly when it emanates from Western sources close to government. In short, it 
is asserted that material interests have long tended to dictate the capitalist West’s 
response to the issue of human rights when it relates to China and in this regard, 
Sino-African ties and the attendant expressed alarm over human rights is no 
exception. It is suggested that concern over competition, particularly over energy 
resources, has reintroduced human rights in to the diplomatic discourse. 
 
Popular perceptions of China and its global role are often shaped by two words: 
“made in”. Yet this vision of China that focuses primarily on Beijing as a coming 
economic superpower is relatively new, and it is not that long ago that two other 
words tended to dominate debates on and discourses of China: “human rights”. To be 
sure, real interest in human rights in China was never the only issue in other states’ 
relations with China, nor consistently pursued throughout the years (Nathan, 1994). 
Nor did human rights totally subsequently disappear from the political agenda. 1   
Nevertheless, the rhetorical importance of human rights—perhaps best epitomised by 
the narrow defeat of resolutions condemning Chinese policy in 1995 at the Human 
Rights Council in Geneva—stands in stark contrast to the relative silence thereafter as 
the bottom line of most states’ relations with Beijing took on ever greater economic 
dimensions.  
 If the rise of China economically marked one watershed in the importance of 
Human Rights, the rise of Chinese interest in Africa marks a second, with an 
escalation in expressions of concern in public discourse, primarily (though not 
exclusively) from Western sources. Of course, there are some genuine causes for 
concern that China’s expansion into Africa may threaten to undermine attempts to 
advance new norms relating to constitutional rights and privileges, as well as broader 
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governance issues (Taylor, 2007). However, much of the rise of human rights 
critiques aimed at Beijing’s expansion into Africa needs to be located within a 
broader context. By examining how the issue of human rights became neglected in 
Western engagement with China, we reveal the same reason that human rights has re-
emerged as a key issue when discussing Sino-African ties. In short, whilst the 
predominance of key economic interests in the West led to the relative neglect of 
human rights in the second half of the 1990s (to help access the Chinese economy), 
the predominance of economic interests and concerns also explain the reassertion of 
the human rights discourse as new Chinese actors come into competition with 
Western corporations in Africa.  
 This article seeks to unpack why it is that human rights has emerged as an 
issue in critical analyses of Sino-African relations. Whilst not minimising some of the 
real concerns and issues about this relationship, we aim to contextualise the motives 
of much of the critique, particularly when it emanates from Western sources close to 
government. In short, it is asserted that material interests have long tended to dictate 
the capitalist West’s response to the issue of human rights when it relates to China 
and in this regard, Sino-African ties and the attendant expressed concerns over human 
rights is no exception. 
 
The Rise of China and the Rise of Human Rights as an Issue 
As noted in the introduction, the importance of human rights has waxed and waned 
throughout the most Mao era. Indeed, in the early periods of reform in the 1980s, the 
general approach was to encourage rather than condemn China. Domestic economic 
reform and the repudiation of the excesses of the Cultural Revolution combined with 
an increasing openness to the global economy. Additionally, Beijing began to involve 
itself in various international regimes vis-à-vis human rights. ‘Perceived as 
undergoing a much-applauded modernization programme with social as well as 
economic ramifications, Beijing was throughout the 1980s given favourable treatment 
by the Western media who saw/hoped that China was being remade as a Chinese 
imitation of the West’s self-image. Western policy-makers replicated this wishful 
aspiration’ (Taylor, 1998: 446). Certainly, the West appeared quite happy that 
Beijing’s contribution to any human rights regime was more rhetorical than anything 
else. Chinese praise for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as ‘the first 
international instrument that systematically sets forth the specific contents regarding 
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respect for and protection of fundamental human rights’, in spite of transgressions, 
underscores this point (quoted in Zhang, 1998: 188). 
 It is arguably only after the Tiananmen Square incident of June 1989 that 
human rights became somewhat re-elevated as a matter of concern (Taylor, 2006). 
The footage of a lone man standing in front of a line of tanks in Beijing stopping them 
from proceeding, became a symbol for a global audience of a struggle for freedom 
that was defeated by military power. The “Tank Man” was even nominated for Time 
magazine’s most influential person of the Twentieth Century as ‘a symbol of the 
world’s desire for freedom’.2
 In fact, within the West there had been a great hope that China’s emergence 
from the relative isolation of the Mao days into global engagement under Deng 
Xiaoping would result in a loosening of political oppression. And indeed, there had 
been signs of a thaw of sorts. Although outright political opposition to the Communist 
Party of China’s (CPC) monopoly on political power remained strictly off limits, the 
party-state had withdrawn from its previous domination of everyday life, allowing the 
creation of a “personal space”; something that might not seem very dramatic when 
compared to the freedoms in a mature liberal democracy, but which was a marked 
difference from the previous polity in China. There had also been some signs of an 
increased toleration of new ideas on how to democratise the party—not to loosen the 
CPC’s grip by allowing others to compete with it for political power, but rather 
strengthening the party by allowing it to become more transparent and plural in its 
thinking (if not plural in its exercise of political power).  
 The evidence was not all one-way however. There had been periodic 
campaigns to combat spiritual pollution and bourgeois liberalism throughout the 
1980s and Hu Yaobang had lost his position as party leader for being too supportive of 
student calls for greater democratisation. So in many ways Tiananmen 1989 was an 
extreme example of the tension between the two dominant strands of the CPC that had 
created periodic internal clashes throughout the first decade of reform—how to re-
legitimate the authoritarianism of CPC rule by liberalising economically and very 
moderately politically on the other. Nevertheless, 1989 acted as a sharp break on the 
optimism that had largely dominated external views of China for much of the 1980s.  
 Yet to say that human rights issues thereafter dominated the major powers’ 
foreign policies towards China after 1989 is rather contentious. It is true that arms 
embargos by Japan, the United States and the European Union (EU) remain in place 
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despite an apparent concerted effort to lift the EU ban led by Jacques Chirac in 2005. 
However, with the benefit of hindsight, we can now see that the sanctions placed on 
China after June 4th were not severe and not in place for very long, with economic 
relations resuming relatively quickly. Indeed, in terms of placing economic sanctions 
on China (either debating them or actually implementing them), human rights has 
been largely irrelevant, with two other issues dominating diplomatic concerns: the 
transfer of military and nuclear technology to other (“rogue”) states; and what are 
considered to be unfair Chinese economic policies and strategies. This makes the 
focus on human rights as a key anxiety by Western commentators vis-à-vis Sino-
African ties the more interesting. 
  
Chinese Responses to Western Criticism 
In responding to Western criticisms, the Chinese authorities have tended to utilise a 
variety of different ways of rebutting criticism. The force of each response has tended 
to vary over time, and as we will see, some of these are more relevant for resisting the 
criticisms over China’s current African adventures than others. The original approach 
was to simply deny that human rights had anything whatsoever to do with China. 
Human rights as demanded by the Western nations were seen as bourgeois liberal 
rights and thus not relevant for the Chinese socialist state. This straightforward 
rejectionist approach was however abandoned in the 1980s as Chinese responses 
tended to argue from within the human rights discourse rather than simply rejecting it 
(Weatherley, 2001; Chen 2005).  
For example, rather than just dismissing the criticism, relativist justifications 
were deployed to explain why China was different. This partly entailed cultural 
relativist positions, with the basic argument that human rights as conceived in the 
West were a result of a specific way that state-society relations evolved under 
capitalism. In China, the traditional emphasis on harmony under Confucianism meant 
that there was no need for the individual guarantees of protection from the state 
provided by the legal protection of individual human rights (Kent, 1993). Moreover, 
Confucianism stressed the importance of the collective rather than the individual. As 
Weatherley (1999) argues, what the collective is has changed over time; from the 
family in the Confucian era to the revolution in the Maoist era to the state today. But 
underpinning all of the different approaches is a common understanding with its roots 
in interpretations that the individual is not the primary focus of state-society relations.  
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But the focus on relativism more often emphasised the materialist dimension. 
The key argument here is that guaranteeing socio-economic and basic standards of 
living must be the main focus, given the level of development in China. Moreover, the 
same was true in the West in similar stages of development. Indeed, in rebutting 
human rights criticism, there is a very strong focus on the Western experience. The 
Chinese point to the slow implementation of rights in the West, and note that it is only 
relatively recently that human rights have been legally guaranteed in even the richest 
most advanced liberal democracies—for example, racial segregation in the US in the 
1960s. When transferred to discussions of Sino-African ties, Beijing is quite assertive 
in arguing that ‘For a starving man, which should he choose bread or ballot, if he is 
supposed to choose only one? The ballot is of course important. But he must feed 
himself with the bread before he can cast a ballot’ (Xinhua, December 12, 2005). 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the main focus of attention is on the US, and a 
related approach is to point to the hypocrisy of those who are criticising China. Since 
1998, the Information Office of the State Council has published an annual Human 
Rights Record of the United States, highlighting what are considered by Beijing to be 
serious human rights abuses. The basic message here is not just that it is hypocritical 
to criticise China when abuses continue at home, but also that human rights is a 
cynical tool used by the US and the rest of the West to keep China and others from 
developing. Ming Wan (2005: 291) has noted that ‘In discussions with Chinese 
diplomats and officials…I sense a strong indignation toward the United States and an 
equally strong conviction that the US human rights pressure was simply an excuse for 
keeping China weakened and subordinated, a humiliating situation that Chinese 
patriots should not allow to happen’. Indeed, the comment in September 1989 by 
Deng that ‘there are many people in the world who hope [China] will develop, but 
there are also many who are out to get us’ (Deng Xiaoping, 1994: 309) is emblematic. 
Deep-seated memories of colonial meddling in China in the nineteenth century and an 
anti-foreignism that is arguably integral to Chinese political culture (Liao Kuangsheng, 
1990; and Lovell, 2007; though cf. Waley-Cohen, 2000) feed into such positions.  
 
China, International Relations and Human Rights: The West Soft Pedals? 
Such arguments were repeated on numerous occasions after 1989 as the West 
maintained a human rights rhetoric in international relations with China (if not always 
backed up with firm and practical policies). Not surprisingly, the Chinese position was 
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very strident in 1995 after the vote at the UN Human Rights Council. Given the close 
vote in 1995, it might seem rather odd that two years later, the EU stopped tabling 
resolutions condemning China, and in 2002, no resolution was tabled by either the US 
or the EU. How do we explain what appears to be such a rapid about turn given the 
close nature of the vote in 1995?3  
 Some have argued that pressing China actually makes things worse in terms of 
the actual practice of human rights on the ground. With socialism replaced by 
nationalism as the ideological basis of CPC rule, depicting the West as attempting to 
constrain China can actually reinforce the party’s nationalist credentials and reinforce 
rather than weaken authoritarian rule. At the very least, from the pragmatic point of 
view, there is not much point in criticising China if nothing ever happens (Wachman 
2001). 
Even for Human Rights Watch the decision to stop pushing on China was a 
result (officially at least) of a combination of the ineffectiveness of criticism and the 
positive consequences of other approaches. While condemning China had resulted in 
only the sort of responses outlined above, other ways of engaging China less 
dramatically and publicly had had positive consequences. For example, after the EU 
stopped sponsoring a UN Human Rights Council resolution, China signed the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1997 and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights the following year.4 China had 
also become increasingly receptive to technical aid from organizations such as the 
UNDP for legal initiatives to protect rights. Moreover, Balducci argues that for the EU 
at least, supporting a UN Human Rights Council resolution would come at the cost of 
the suspension of bilateral dialogue on human rights with China, which was deemed 
as being more productive. But as Balducci also notes, in the years after 1995, the 
Chinese authorities had deliberately targeted key EU states—most notably France and 
Germany—as key economic partners who might be in a position to win more 
contracts from China in the future.5 And this brings us to the rather thorny but crucial 
issue of the relationship between promoting human rights and promoting capitalist 
relations as this directly informs much of the critique of current Sino-African ties.  
 
An Economic Agenda? 
Underpinning much of the argument that “megaphone diplomacy” and “China 
bashing” do not work is an implicit and sometimes explicit reference to classic liberal 
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international relations theory. In short, the best way of ensuring that human rights 
improve in China in the long run is by engaging China economically and politically 
and enmeshing it in the global capitalist order. This will ostensibly lead to the 
socialisation of China and the gradual acceptance of international (i.e. liberal) norms, 
and subsequently the transferral of these norms into the domestic sphere. Ostracising 
and potentially isolating China according to this logic is no good—it should be 
engaged and this will stimulate change. What this position means is that engaging 
China economically is not only acceptable in the absence of political liberalisation 
and the promotion of human rights, but will actually help make the positive transition 
towards a more liberal regime.  
 However, for some, this position simply provides a cynical theoretical 
justification for putting human rights to one side and instead concentrating on the 
promotion of business (this criticism was made against British policy towards China 
and is outlined in detail in Breslin 2004). After a brief period of economic 
retrenchment after 1989, a new push towards liberalisation and global integration 
followed Deng Xiaoping’s overt support for proto-capitalist practices during his 
southern tour of China in 1992—the nanxun. From then on, the potential benefits of 
engaging China economically mushroomed, but this was a potential that was not 
easily unlocked. Gaining access to the Chinese market and gaining contacts was not 
easy because the Chinese state remained the central actor in deciding which foreign 
actors could do what, where. Moreover, in seeking greater contacts with the newly 
burgeoning Chinese economy, many companies found that they were clearly and 
explicitly linked to “their” home country, and that country’s policies towards China. 
In short, Chinese authorities tended to reward and punish private commercial interests 
based on national economic considerations.  
 This can and does occur in a “tit for tat” manner in response to the imposition 
of, for example, the use of anti-dumping legislation and other trade sanctions by 
importing countries. For example, when the US imposed trade sanctions on China as a 
result of the transfer of military technology to Pakistan, the Chinese aviation 
authorities switched from purchasing Boeing jets to the European Airbus, much to the 
annoyance of American authorities who felt that Europe should have held a common 
position with the US, rather than exploiting the situation for commercial benefit. 
 What the Airbus example suggests is that there are high levels of competition 
to access the Chinese market and what governments do (or do not do) has a key role 
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in easing the process (or not, of course). Government support is therefore essential in 
not just technical support such as the provision of export credit guarantees, but also in 
the provision of “positive” political relationships at the highest level. As Lord Powell 
noted referring to UK policy, ‘A good bilateral relationship at the political level is 
very important for doing business in China—and probably more important in the case 
of China than most other countries, simply because the role of the state and the 
government is so big’.6  For example, the visit of Jiang Zemin to the UK in 1999 was 
considered as highly successful by the Chinese, not least because the British visit was 
not marred by demonstrations and protests by human rights activists as a previous 
visit to Switzerland had been. While the UK visit resulted in the signing of new 
contracts for UK firms, Jiang Zemin told the Swiss parliament that as a result of being 
subject to protests, ‘you have lost a good friend’ (Guardian, October 20, 1999).  
      
Human Rights, Sino-US Relations and MFN 
Economic issues were also crucially important in removing one of the key—and most 
high profile arenas for human rights criticism of China—the annual vote in 
Washington over whether to renew Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to China. The 
Jackson-Vanik (Title IV) amendment to the 1974 Trade Act was introduced to provide 
an economic means of punishing states deemed by Washington as authoritarian. In 
inception, the amendment was designed to block normal access to the American 
market for those states that were considered to unfairly prevent emigration. ‘To assure 
the continued dedication of the United States to fundamental human rights’ normal 
trade relations could be denied to any ‘nonmarket economy’ that ‘engages in practices 
prohibiting or severely restricting free emigration of its citizens’.7   
 Although originally focused on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as China 
became economically more important, so debates over renewing MFN became more 
intense. MFN should, in theory only be renewed if there is clear evidence of 
improvement, and the annual Presidential proposal to renew MFN always resulted in 
a welter of complaints about China’s human rights record, one-child policy, treatment 
of Tibet, policy towards Taiwan, unfair trade practices, trade surplus, labour abuses, 
arms sales, military technology transfer, environmental degradation and so on 
(particularly so under Clinton who had been highly critical of Bush’s accommodation 
with China and the abandonment of ethical human rights concerns—only then to 
continue the same approach after his election).  
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 The decision to extend MFN repeated the liberal arguments outlined above—
that notwithstanding China’s poor human rights record, “constructive engagement” 
through the extension of economic relations was the best way of ultimately improving 
this Human Rights situation. Perhaps successive Presidents really did believe that 
engaging China in commercial terms would lead to political and social change in 
China, but not everybody was convinced. Indeed, much of the debate over MFN was 
couched in straightforward economic terms and the promotion of American capitalist 
interests. If MFN were not extended, then American corporations would not be 
eligible for export credit and investment guarantees from the federal government. For 
major corporations such as Boeing, Chrysler, and General Motors, these guarantees 
were essential for their growing relationship with China—and as noted above, a 
relationship with China in which they could easily lose out to European or other 
competitors. Given that EU states in particular were perceived as being less interested 
in human rights in China than developing commercial contacts, if the US took a moral 
stance, then it was claimed that American companies would lose out to their European 
competitors (Roden, 2000). 
 Perhaps not surprisingly then, every President renewed the waiver and MFN—
but crucially, the need to have an annual vote disappeared with the 1999 decision to 
grant China Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) as part of the process of 
laying the foundation for China’s World Trade Organization (WTO) entry. In the 
words of Long Yongtu: 
 The question concerning MFN status had long been the crucial factor for 
difficulties in China-US negotiation, US Congress' involvement in it had made 
the negotiation more politicized…. I want to point out that entry into the WTO 
would make future trade disputes between us and other countries and regions 
not easily be politicized (People’s Daily, November 12, 2001) 
 
With WTO entry, the annual theatre of debating China was removed, and American 
Presidents were no longer left to justify why they were putting aside the human rights 
concerns of Jackson-Vanik in favour of facilitating economic relations. Consequently, 
‘although Western criticism of China’s human rights remained, it gradually became 
ritualised and marginalized on Western diplomatic agendas in China’ (Ming Wan, 
2005: 288). 
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Sino-US Relations and Human Rights Today 
PNTR and WTO entry have massively reduced human rights as a high-profile 
(publicly consumed) issue in Sino-US relations. Chinese support for the “War on 
Terror” in Afghanistan and its role as a key broker in six party talks over North Korea 
have also helped. But human rights issues have not entirely gone away. Campaigning 
groups like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and those that focus on 
specific Chinese issues (Tibet, Falungong etc) continue to endeavour to keep these 
issues on the agenda. This entails not just criticising China, but criticising 
governments in the West for not criticising China.  
 In addition, human rights have come to the fore in other ways—but again we 
argue that it is economics that leads with human rights simply a tool rather than an 
end in itself. Moreover, it is not Chinese politics—human rights abuses and so on—
that is the main issue now as it was during the MFN renewal debates outlined above. 
Rather it is what human rights abuses in China mean for American economic interests 
that are most important. If the MFN debates were about ignoring human rights to 
promote American capitalist interests, when human rights issues are now raised vis-à-
vis China, they are raised because of the way they are perceived to be damaging 
different American interests—Africa is a classic case in this regard. The key concern 
now is linked to American politics and in particular dealing with the concerns of those 
who face competition from Chinese corporations. The Chinese case is particularly 
interesting because it combines the Left and Right in the US—trade unions and 
nationalist Republicans on economic terms, and liberals and conservatives on 
individual human rights.  
 For example, in calling for the introduction of restrictions on textile imports 
from China, Lindsey Graham, Republican Senator for South Carolina justified his 
calls by saying that, ‘I have long maintained that China cheats on trade agreements. 
The practices of Chinese companies and the policies of the Chinese government are 
illegal and give them an unfair advantage’ (Barboza 2003). But it is not just “normal” 
trade violations that are important here. In their evidence to support a case against 
Chinese steel imports, Price et al (2006: 56-7) cite the US Department of State’s 
(2005) report on human rights in China as an example of how what happens in China 
unfairly impacts on jobs in the US. According to this report, production in China was 
aided by the lack of “comprehensive” legislation relating to child labour, non-
payment of wages, violation of maximum working hour regulations, poor 
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enforcement of health and safety regulations, and the use of harmful materials in 
production.  
Whilst not wishing to unduly suggest that anybody involved was unconcerned 
about what was happening in China itself, at least as significant here is the price 
advantage that such abuses gives to Chinese producers, and the position this places 
them in vis-à-vis their American competitors. For example, in a petition to President 
Bush asking for action against Chinese imports, the AFLCIO and the Industrial Union 
Council argued that more than 727,000 American jobs had been lost as a direct result 
of labour abuses in China. If these labour abuses were halted, they argued that the 
price of Chinese manufactured goods would rise by 12 to 77 percent.8
 Similarly, in a petition to the government recalling for PNTR to be revoked 
and MFN restored in 2006, Byron Dorgan and Lindsey pointed to the growth of the 
US trade deficit with China from $83 billion in 2001 to $202 billion in 2005. 
According to Dorgan, ‘The Chinese have engaged in labour abuses, intellectual 
property theft and piracy, currency manipulation, and unfair barriers against U.S. 
exports. Americans cannot, and should not be asked to, compete under these 
circumstances’.9 Competition with Beijing is clearly at the crux of many critiques of  
China’s human rights records. How this is played out in Africa reveals this quite 
unmistakably. 
 
Africa, China and Human Rights 
There can be no doubt that individuals, nongovernmental organisations and other 
actors are genuine in their concern about human rights issues as to how they relate to 
Sino-African ties. This is not in question. However, the welter of critiques 
(particularly official critiques) aimed at this relationship is more likely grounded in 
concern over the way Beijing’s non-interference policy and its arguable lack of 
interest in human rights situations in the African states in which it engages with—as 
well as the domestic human rights situation back in China—provide Chinese 
corporations with a comparative advantage that Western capitalist actors do not enjoy. 
 Immediately post-Tiananmen it is true that there was a sudden focus on 
China’s human rights record. But this, as shown above, dissipated very quickly and 
business as usual rapidly reasserted itself. Making huge profits in China in an 
environment marked by very low wages and environmental standards, with an 
oppressive labour regime providing the broader framework, was never apparently an 
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issue for most Western companies and governments (unless and until covert 
investigators exposed a particular sweatshop). Yet currently, human rights are placed 
central to many evaluations of China’s ties with Africa.     
If one accepts the Chinese discourse on human rights and the centrality of 
development, then to be fair it should be pointed out that China has made quite 
considerable progress over the last few decades. Indeed, as Burstein and De Keijzer 
(1999: 136) point out, ‘To the Chinese, the human rights to food, clothing, shelter, 
economic development, and security…are paramount over traditional Western-style 
individual political liberties. Judged by this standard, China in the last twenty years is 
a leader, not a laggard, in promoting the human rights of its people’. And 
Peerenboom (2007: 173) argues that: 
[The US State Department] reports for China invariably start with a 
description of the nature of the political regime, as if that were the most 
significant determinant for rights in the country. [For example,] the 2004 
report on China begins: ‘The People’s Republic of China…is an authoritarian 
state in which…the Chinese Communist Party…is the paramount source of 
power’. Imagine if it began instead: ‘Human rights and other indicators of 
well-being across the board are highly correlated with wealth. China 
outperforms the average country in its lower-middle income category on 
every major indicator except civil and political rights (as is generally true for 
other East Asian countries)’. 
 
In fact, as Peerenboom notes, the rule of law, good governance and almost all rights 
(including civil and political rights) are correlated with levels of wealth. Thus 
comparing China to the developed world unsurprisingly reveals that China has more 
departures from the rule of law, weaker state institutions, more corruption and less 
individual freedoms than their Western counterparts. But is that, Peerenboom asks, a 
fair comparison? 
When it comes to Chinese foreign policy, Burstein and De Keijzer point out, 
‘while the human rights situation in China is not good by American standards, it is not 
unlike that in Indonesia, India or Saudi Arabia, for instance. Yet in most of these cases, 
the United States is able to have normal and even close relationships that are not 
overwhelmed by the human rights agenda’ (Burstein and De Keijzer, 1999: 137). 
Furthermore, ‘European and North American leaders in general, and French 
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politicians in particular, tend to give their African counterparts lessons on democracy, 
respect for human rights, and governmental transparency—even if such lessons are 
also exercises in Western hypocrisy. France, for instance, maintains privileged 
relations with the corrupt regimes of oil-rich Gabon, ruled since 1968 by Omar Bongo, 
and of Congo-Brazzaville (Republic of the Congo). And the United States has been 
wooing African dictators such as Teodoro Obiang and Eduardo dos Santos, who rule 
oil-rich, poverty-ridden Equatorial Guinea and Angola, respectively, both since 1979’ 
(Inter Press Service, November 15, 2006).  
Indeed, it is important to avoid what Peerenboom (2007) observes in some 
critiques of the Chinese human rights record, namely that this is often arguably 
spurred on by particular interests that wish to contain China’s development and 
influence. Zheng Yongnian (1999: 105) notes that indeed within China there is a 
suspicion that ‘forces do not like to see a strong China with a rapid growing economy. 
Because they perceive China as their potential rival, they will use all possible means 
including the Taiwan, Tibet and human rights issues to contain China’s development’. 
In fact, by focusing significantly on Beijing’s human rights stance in Africa, 
to the detriment of other features of the relationship, there is an implicit 
delegitimization of China and, by extension, what “the Chinese” are doing, either at 
home or abroad. For instance, Chinese ties with Zimbabwe are indeed arguably 
problematic given the nature of Mugabe’s regime, yet South African interests are 
equally complicit in their engagement with Harare, with South African businesses 
exploiting opportunities thrown up by the Zimbabwe economic crisis (Solidarity 
Peace Trust, 2007). This does not mean that Beijing can or should be above criticism, 
only that context is required when discussing such issues as a means to avoid the 
exoticization, if not demonisation, of China and its engagements in Africa. 
Yet as Li Xing (1996: 40) notes, the difficulty facing China’s rulers is that on 
the one hand they have sought national independence from Western political influence 
and on the other hand have sought to “catch up” with the West and modernize the 
economy through ever-deeper integration with the capitalist world market. This 
contradiction is often played out around human rights issues and in fact, taking the 
analysis further, it might be argued that infringing some human rights in China itself 
(poor labour conditions, for instance) is a pre-condition for Beijing’s reintegration 
into the global political economy, something which is actively encouraged by the 
West and its profit-seeking corporations.  
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Indeed, it is a fact that ‘human rights abuses under the banner of “preserving 
order” are aimed at maintaining the position of the ruling elements [in China]. But it 
is also undeniable that the state sees the necessity to maintain long-term stability and 
predictability of the system in order to attract much-needed foreign investment and 
technology’ (Li Xing, 1996: 34). In this light, critiquing China’s human rights stance 
when it is played out in Africa, whilst selectively overlooking the abuses that underpin 
much of the consumer boom in the developed world, driven in part by cheap Chinese 
imports, lacks coherence, as does ignoring continued Western support for assorted 
dictators and corrupt regimes across Africa.  
It can be reasonably charged that when Western oil corporations complain 
about the Chinese sewing up oil deals in the Gulf of Guinea through corrupt and 
opaque means, they are being deeply hypocritical, as it has long been alleged that 
Western companies, with the tacit approval of their home governments, have used 
graft to secure deals (Shaxson, 2007). In some cases this is not even tacit but quite 
open. After all, the Elf corruption scandal in France revealed that annual cash 
transfers totalling about £10m [$5 million] were made to Omar Bongo, Gabon’s 
president, while other huge sums were paid to leaders in Angola, Cameroon and 
Congo-Brazzaville. The multi-million dollar payments were partly aimed at 
guaranteeing that it was Elf and not US or British firms that pumped the oil, but also 
to ensure the African leaders continued allegiance to France (Guardian, November 13, 
2003). Damning indictments of Shell’s activities in Nigeria are well-known (Okonta 
and Douglas, 2003) whilst Condoleezza Rice publicly labelled Equatorial Guinea’s 
notorious president, Teodoro Obiang Nguema, as a “good friend” of the United States 
(Washington Post, April 18, 2006), even though it is characterized as a “criminal 
state” elsewhere (Wood, 2004). So constructing China’s diplomacy as “bad” whilst 
glossing over Western governments’ and corporations’ own duplicity in Africa is 
somewhat unpalatable.  
Indeed, much criticism of Beijing has focussed on the apparent willingness to 
finance corrupt and autocratic regimes and this is often denoted as being emblematic 
of Sino-African ties. For instance, after three decades of civil war, the Angolan 
government was on the verge of accepting an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan 
package that stipulated strict conditions regarding monitoring of the domestic 
situation and distribution of aid. However, in the face of a $2 billion unconditional aid 
package from Beijing, the Angolan government rejected the IMF’s offer in favour of 
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China’s, of which one of the few stipulations was the right to 10,000 barrels of oil per 
day. This arguably undercut the IMF’s efforts at increasing transparency. However, it 
does need to be pointed out that in 2004, Standard Chartered, backed by a consortium 
of European banks, including Barclays and Royal Bank of Scotland, disbursed a loan 
of $2.35 billion to Angola’s state oil company, Sonangol. Repayments over five years 
were guaranteed from future oil production (Guardian, June 1, 2005). In other words, 
the Chinese are not the only ones financing the corrupt regime in Luanda, with its 
poor human rights record. 
However, though there is a great deal to be said regarding the pointing out of 
Western hypocrisy vis-à-vis human rights and Africa, such analysis does not help the 
average Zimbabwean or Sudanese labouring under autocratic and oppressive 
governments and casting a weary eye at Chinese support for her oppressor. Here, 
Beijing’s thinking on non-interference and its hands off attitude vis-à-vis human 
rights and governance needs to modify if it is to avoid being cast by critics as a friend 
of despots (as some Western countries are). It is imperative that Beijing needs to 
recognize that its dealings with some regimes in Africa at the state-to-state level risks 
tarnishing its whole African enterprise. There is actually some evidence that a rethink 
is occurring and Chinese thinking on human rights and sovereignty ‘is less a static 
concept than an idea in flux’ (Gill and Reilly, 2000: 42).  
Yet it needs to be reiterated that in judging Western critiques of China’s human 
rights policies both domestically and how they play out in Africa, the motives and 
origins of these critiques needs contextualisation. Doing so provides an interesting 
take on how Western powers are reacting to the growing Chinese presence in Africa 
and how concern over competition, particularly over energy resources, has 
reintroduced human rights in to the diplomatic discourse after many years of neglect 
and oversight. How and why this is so speaks volumes over the authenticity of these 
apprehensions vis-à-vis the average African (and Chinese) person. 
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1  For examples of how human rights has continued to influence China’s bilateral relations with other 
states, see Foot (2003, 2004), Zhou Qi (2005) and Drury (2006). Most of the discussion of the 
international relations of China’s human rights regime not surprisingly focuses on relations with the US, 
though there is also interest in human rights in EU policy towards China and Asia – for example 
Wiessala (2006).  
2 Albert Einstein won the accolade in the end, but the “unknown hero” did make the top 100 as one of 
the twenty leaders and revolutionaries ‘who helped define the political and social fabric of our time’ 
(alongside Mao Zedong). See www.time.com/time/time100/leaders/ 
3  We should note that this was not a result of all EU states making a decision at the same time, but that 
the failure to achieve full support for a resolution meant that it could not be tabled under the name of 
the EU.   
4 The first has subsequently been ratified by the Chinese (in February 2001) - though with a waiver on 
the right to form and join free trade unions. 
5  References to Balducci are from his doctoral thesis on EU policy towards China to be submitted at 
the University of Warwick in 2008.  
6 Lord Powell is Chair of the China-Britain Business Council. Oral Evidence to Foreign Affairs 
Committee (2000).  
7  For more details, and a detailed discussion on how MFN was extended to China and then replaced by 
PNTR in the run up to WTO entry, see chapter three of Breslin (2007).  
8 AFLCIO website -www.aflcio.org/issues/jobseconomy/globaleconomy/ExecSummary301.cfm 
9 This quote is taken from Dorgan’s web page, which includes a link to the text of the petition. See 
http://dorgan.senate.gov/issues/economy/chinatrade
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